concerned, or (normally when required by law) to be in an overriding public interest (3) .
The medical profession's stance on confidentiality and discretion can be morally justified on the understanding that duties originate from relationships, and that medical practice involves relationships of trust both with individual patients and with society. Doctors promise to make 'the health of my patient ... my first consideration', and 'to consecrate my life to the service of humanity' (2) . This inevitably calls for trust in the discretion of doctors when the claims of an individual patient conflict with the wider interests of society generally.
Medical confidentiality serves the patient's health in two ways: a free exchange of information in a relationship ofmutual trust is therapeutically effective; and confidentiality protects the patient's autonomy from being constrained by those outside a trusting relationship gaining access to sensitive personal information. Medical confidentiality also normally serves the common good: most patients either have no secrets which could endanger public health, or, if they do, can be encouraged within a confidential relationship to disclose them voluntarily to whoever has a need to know. It is only in very exceptional cases, when the patient cannot be persuaded to disclose a harmful secret voluntarily, that an exception to the rule may be justifiable. But the doctor's promise to put the patient's health irst, means that the onus of proof is on showing that the exception is justified. All of this is only underlined by the fact that in at least one context, sexually transmitted disease (STD) clinics, medical confidentiality is protected by legislation.
HIV Infection and AIDS
The moral reasons for maintaining or breaching medical confidentiality have not been changed by the advent of AIDS. HIV infection, however, has the potential not only to create a medical pandemic, but also to provoke social prejudice. This makes it especially important to protect patients with HIV infection or AIDS from casual or unintentional breaches of confidentiality. At the same time, the need to control the spread of infection makes it vital that maintaining confidentiality should serve the common good as well as that of the individual patient. In some cases these goals may be, or may be perceived to be, in conflict.
This paper discusses the ethics of medical confidentiality in such cases. Its approach embodies the view that a relationship of mutual empowerment between clinician and patient serves the ends both of medical beneficence and of patient autonomy. The concept of mutual empowerment is based on the following considerations:
a) The ultimate power ofdecision-making about their own future normally and properly belongs to patients themselves. b) Patients, unaided by effective communication, may not possess even the most basic medical information required for choices about their clinical treatment; and they will often be unable to interpret the implications of the state to which their illness has progressed. c) Clinicians have knowledge and skill which they can not only exercise for the good of patients, but also put at patients' disposal, providing them with the information and practical assistance they require to make and carry out their own responsible decisions. d) Clinicians cannot do this effectively, unless they in turn are provided by patients with adequate information about their way oflife and how they hope to be enabled by their treatment.
A relationship of mutual empowerment, we suggest, is more likely to be realised if patients understand the ground rules of medical confidentiality. With this in mind, we examine the implications of a General Medical Council statement of May 1988 on the subject (see below), with particular reference to different medical contexts and to the patient's informed choice as a significant factor in decisions about medical confidentiality.
We begin with two examples based on simplified scenarios which illustrate the problem under discussion.
John and Jane John was in his mid-thirties, married and with two young children, when his company sent him to set up a new branch in Central Africa. He was nine months on his own, and during that time he worked exceptionally hard and successfully, letting himself go only on one regretted occasion when, after a convivial evening with some clients, he visited a local brothel.
By the time John returned home, Jane had found a cottage in her parents' village where their belongings could be stored when they returned to Africa together. Dr Macphee thought about the problem, decided to maintain confidentiality, and parried Tracy's further enquiries by saying that Kevin was now his problem, not hers. A few weeks later, in his capacity as an expert in HIV medicine at the regional centre, he received a letter from a doctor in the town where the actress was playing. Would Dr Macphee see this young woman, who had an unusual glandular-fever-like illness with pronounced neurological features? The doctor understood that her boy-friend was an ex-drug-user. She too turned out to be infected.
These two examples illustrate ethical tensions related to confidentiality in the context of HIV infection and AIDS. Each example, clearly, is coloured by particular cultural assumptions about men, women, guilt, innocence, sexuality, family life, family doctoring and hospital clinics. But a common feature of both is that a bad situation seems to have been made worse by failure to exploit all the constructive possibilities of the clinician-patient relationship. Dr Browne cut these possibilities short by precipitately raising the question of breaching confidentiality. Dr Macphee also may have done so, by focusing attention on Tracy's claims, rather than by creating an atmosphere in which Kevin was more likely to take his advice about the risks of any further sexual relationships he might have.
Neither Dr Browne and John, nor Dr Macphee and Kevin, in other words, seem to have been successful in establishing a relationship of mutual empowerment. The human limitations and fallibility of individual doctors and patients mean, of course, that this ideal is not always realised in practice. But insofar as it is, it may be possible to avert some of the harmful consequences illustrated above.
The ideal of mutual empowerment is more likely to be achieved, we believe, if patients and the public, as well as clinicians, begin from a realistic understanding of the ethics of medical confidentiality -that there are morally defensible reasons why doctors have a duty to preserve confidentiality in most circumstances and to consider breaching it on some rare occasions.
Guidance and interpretation A significant step towards such understanding was taken by the General Medical Council, in its statement of May 1988.
'Questions of conflicting obligations ... arise when a doctor is faced with the decision whether the fact that a patient is HIV positive or suffering from AIDS should be disclosed to a third party, other than another health-care professional, without the consent of the patient. The council has reached the view that there are grounds for disclosure only when there is a serious and identifiable risk to a specific individual who, if not so informed, would be exposed to infection. Therefore, when a person is found to be infected in this way, the doctor must discuss with the patient the question of informing a spouse or other sexual partner. The council believes that most patients will agree to disclosure in these circumstances, but where such consent is withheld the doctor may consider it a duty to seek to ensure that any sexual partner is informed, in order to safeguard such persons from a possible fatal infection' (4 Dr Macphee's reasoning might be as follows. In his considered judgement, Tracy's allegation of a 'serious and identifiable risk to a specific individual' was less convincing than Kevin's threat to go elsewhere if his confidentiality was breached. It is not uncommon for doctors to be given information which might be important to third parties, but which they can neither directly prove nor immediately act upon. Those in Dr Macphee's position -hospital consultants to whose clinic patients have direct access -cannot influence their patients' behaviour by manipulating family or social pressures. If he did go elsewhere, Dr Macphee thought it quite possible that Kevin might infect several other women before he needed to seek further medical assistance. The best chance of avoiding this, was for Dr Macphee to maintain confidentiality, make clear to Kevin that he had no illusions, and try to persuade him to undertake not to put any other person at risk. Dr Macphee's argument then, is that he interpreted the General Medical Council's guidance in the way he judged most likely, at the time, to serve the health both of his patient and of the public. But Dr Browne in our first example, if he disregarded the possibility that John could have infected others, also might have argued that he was interpreting the guidance with these ends in view. Since it seems that the same guidance can be followed either by maintaining or by breaching A further HIV-related example ofinformed choice is when one drug-abuser is at risk of being infected by sharing needles with another who conceals from him that he is HIV-positive. If both are patients of the same doctor, and the doctor decides to inform the atrisk patient by breaching the other patient's confidentiality, his reasons for doing this presumably include the need to provide him with information which might help him decide against the risk-bearing activity.
But is the doctor justified in breaching confidentiality in this case? It differs from that of the surgeon in at least two significant ways. The first is that needle-sharing, unlike surgery, is one of the surest ways of becoming infected -both because of the direct blood-to-blood contact and because anyone now prepared to do this is already quite likely to be infected. The second difference is that almost all of the information to be given by breaching confidentiality is already public knowledge; and (since in this case the person at risk is the doctor's patient) it is precisely the information of which the doctor should be making every effort to help the patient become aware in relation to his own behaviour.
Taking these features into account, it can be argued that, unless the doctor judges that his efforts have failed to help the at-risk individual become aware of the risks (and hence to make an informed decision against drug-injecting), the doctor has not sufficient reason to breach his other patient's confidentiality. In this case, moreover, the doctor's normal duty to maintain confidentiality is reinforced by the hope that in so doing he may encourage his infected patient to change his behaviour, thereby protecting not only his own uninfected patient, but also others potentially at risk.
The difference between the case of the surgeon and that of the drug abuser suggests a way ofdistinguishing whether or not it is justifiable to consider breaching confidentiality when there is a risk of sexually transmitted HIV infection. Again, the moral factor of informed choice is central.
If a specific individual, unable to give informed consent to sexual intercourse because of immaturity or mental incapacity, is at risk of being infected by a doctor's patient, or if anyone is at risk of being raped or otherwise assaulted by him, the doctor has a clear duty to breach confidentiality either to the authorities or to the individual at risk. The doctor again has a duty, in this case to consider breaching confidentiality, if an HIV-positive patient refuses to disclose his HIV status to a potential sexual partner, who has no reason to suspect it. If the person at risk also is the doctor's patient, and there is no other way of making him aware of the risk, a breach of confidentiality can be justified by arguing that he cannot make a free choice about having intercourse, without first being informed, by his doctor, of the exceptional unsuspected risks.
Duties to patients
The ethical implications are more complex, however, if the person at risk is not a patient of the same doctor, or if the person at risk might have reason to suspect that their sexual partner is infected. In the latter case, the patient at risk may appear unaware of what the doctor would consider reasonable grounds for uncertainty about whether or not their potential partner is infected -for example, that they either have had other sexual partners, or have previously contracted a sexually transmitted disease. Since these may still be popularly regarded as less risky forms of behaviour than, for example, needle-sharing, it might be argued that in this case the doctor does have a duty to breach confidentiality, in order to protect the at-risk patient.
There are strong reasons for resisting this argument. What the doctor may consider as a duty, the General Medical Council states, is 'to seek to ensure that any sexual partner is informed, in order to safeguard such persons from a possible fatal infection'. His first duty therefore is to make every effort to ensure that his patient becomes informed of the facts of HIV transmission.
How the doctor chooses to do this without breaching his other patient's confidentiality will depend upon the circumstances. On the rare occasions when this problem arises the doctor may well find ways ofsolving it without compromising either confidentiality or honesty. But there may be occasions, particularly when there is no apparent reason for his initiative, when this is not possible, and the doctor has to choose either to lie, or to risk awakening the suspicion that he knows more than he admits.
In these exceptional circumstances the doctor's choice will reflect not only how absolute a duty he believes maintaining confidentiality to be, but also his assessment of the consequences of breaching confidentiality, both for the doctor-patient relationship in general, and specifically for the subsequent response of both patients. A crucial factor will be the doctor's judgement about how far, by maintaining confidentiality, he can encourage the infected patient to acknowledge his or her responsibility to respect the interests of others.
Often, however, some way can be found, without directly breaching confidentiality, of ensuring that the at-risk patient becomes able to make his or her own informed choice. Even in the case of John and Jane, for example, Dr Browne might have averted the circumstances in which he felt it necessary to breach confidentiality, if he had been alert earlier to the possible counselling implications of treating a gynaecological condition in the wife of a man living alone for nine months in a part of the world where there is known to be a high risk of HIV infection. In committee he was a master, with an instant and untiring grasp of issues, personalities and timing. That, with his gift for the short, quiet phrase that bestowed reward, consensus or condign punishment, made him a welcome ally, a feared opponent and a much sought-after chairman. Where lesser doctors affect to despise committee work, he relished it. He simply excelled, and once confided that his obstetric past had been ideal preparation: to confront the unpromising, achieve the unexpected, and do so against a non-negotiable deadline often in the unsociable hours had nurtured, he conceded, certain useful skills over the decades.
He was born in India, 
